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I. INTRODUCTION
Some rules of evidence are complex. The federal rules governing the
admissibility of hearsay statements,1 for example, include at least forty
different provisions.2 Numerous judges and scholars have commented on
*
© 2021 Dora W. Klein. Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law.
1. A hearsay statement is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2. These include: FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A)
(establishing exemption from the definition of hearsay for a declarant-witness’s prior
inconsistent statement); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (establishing exemption from the
definition of hearsay for a declarant-witness’s prior consistent statement); FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(C) (establishing exemption from the definition of hearsay for a declarantwitness’s statement of identification); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)–(E) (establishing five
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the complexity of the hearsay rules.3 Not all rules of evidence are complex,
however. For example, the federal rules governing the admissibility of
character evidence4 are relatively straightforward5: evidence that is offered
for the purpose of proving character is inadmissible,6 subject to a few

exemptions from the definition of hearsay for party-opponent statements); FED. R. EVID.
802 (stating that hearsay is generally not admissible); FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(23) (setting
forth twenty-three exceptions); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (setting forth four exceptions when
declarant is unavailable); FED. R. EVID. 805 (addressing hearsay within hearsay); FED. R.
EVID. 806 (addressing challenges to a hearsay declarant’s credibility); FED. R. EVID. 807
(defining the residual exception).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Simms, 757 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
rules of evidence regarding hearsay are complex . . . .”); United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d
792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring) (“The ‘hearsay rule’ is too complex, as
well as being archaic.”); Michael L. Seigel, The Effective Use of War Stories in Teaching
Evidence, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1191, 1193 (2006) (“[T]he very complex theoretical issue
of what constitutes hearsay” is one of two “difficult parts of the law of evidence.”); W.
Bradley Wendel, Conflicts of Interest Under the Revised Model Rules, 81 NEB. L. REV.
1363, 1364 (2003) (citing the hearsay rule and the rule against perpetuities as examples of
rules that are “notoriously complex and subtle”). But see R. George Wright, The Illusion
of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 715, 737 (2000) (“Certainly, the evidentiary hearsay rule, along with its many
exceptions, is commonly thought of as relatively complex. But even the hearsay rule cannot be
complex in every respect.” (footnote omitted)).
4. Character evidence is evidence that “refers to elements of one’s disposition,
‘such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness,’” which shows “a propensity for acting in
certain ways under certain conditions.” United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir.
1998) (quoting United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 1982), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2001)).
5. In certain cases, the application of Rule 404(b) can be legitimately complex.
For example, in some cases it can be unclear whether other acts evidence is being offered
for the purpose of proving character, and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 404(b), or
whether the evidence is being offered for a non-character purpose, and is therefore not
inadmissible under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2014)
(en banc) (“The rule is straightforward enough, but confusion arises because admissibility
is keyed to the purpose for which the evidence is offered, and other-act evidence is usually
capable of being used for multiple purposes, one of which is propensity.” (emphasis in
original)). Additionally, whether evidence is “other acts” evidence is not always an easy
question to answer. For example, courts have sometimes struggled to determine whether
“background” evidence or “intertwined” evidence qualifies as evidence of “other acts”
or is instead evidence of the currently charged act. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 111
F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In this case, it was not clear that the testimony involved
other acts within the meaning of Rule 404(b).”). Although application of Rule 404(b) to
the facts of some cases results in difficult questions, what the rule requires—exclusion of
all other acts evidence offered for the purpose of proving character—is perfectly clear.
6. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (“Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait.”); FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (“Prohibited Uses.
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.”). Both of these provisions clearly state that character evidence is inadmissible.
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well-defined exceptions.7
Despite this relative straightforwardness, many of the federal circuit
courts of appeals have overlaid the rules regarding character evidence—
particularly Rule 404(b)—with unnecessary interpretive heuristics, leading to
evidentiary decisions that are contrary to the purpose of the rules. For example,
many of the federal circuit courts of appeals have issued opinions implying
or even explicitly asserting that the “inclusive” structure of Rule 404(b)8
creates a “presumption of admissibility”9—when in fact the rule should be
applied as “a rule of general exclusion.”10 As is discussed in more detail
in Part II, the structure of Rule 404(b) is properly described as inclusive,
meaning that the rule prohibits a specific kind of evidence if offered for
one purpose but does not prohibit the evidence if offered for any other
purpose.11 In contrast, rules with an exclusive structure prohibit a specific
kind of evidence except if offered for a permitted purpose.12 The inclusive
structure of Rule 404(b) has inspired numerous courts to engage in discussions
about the rule being one of “inclusion” rather than “exclusion.”13 Although
there is no real dispute that the structure of Rule 404(b) is properly considered
inclusive, problems arise because courts use the inclusive structure of
Rule 404(b) to create unwarranted and erroneous presumptions about the
admissibility of other acts evidence.14
The focus of this Article is Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which prohibits the use of evidence of “crimes, wrongs, or other acts”—
that is, evidence of “acts that are not part of the events giving rise to the
present charges”15—for the purpose of proving that someone, usually

7. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (“Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a
Criminal Case”); FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (“Exceptions for a Witness”); FED. R. EVID. 413–
15 (providing rules that allow for the use of character evidence in sexual assault cases).
8. These courts are correct in describing the structure of Rule 404(b) as inclusive,
but the implications they draw from this structure are misleading. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Rule 404(b)
is a rule of general exclusion . . . .”). Rule 404(b) is properly described as a rule of general
exclusion, despite its inclusive structure, because the purpose of the rule is the exclusion
of other acts evidence when offered to prove character.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1372 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989)).
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a criminal defendant,16 has a particular kind of character and was therefore
likely to have acted in a particular way consistent with that character.17
For example, the rule would prohibit the use of a criminal defendant’s
prior conviction for assault to prove that he is a violent person who likely
committed a presently charged assault.18 Rule 404(b) is an exceptionally
important rule of evidence, especially for criminal defendants, because it
is one of the rules that determines whether a criminal defendant’s prior
conviction is admissible.19 The extreme and inherent unfair prejudice to
criminal defendants that results from the admission of evidence of prior
convictions is arguably the most problematic consequence of viewing

16. See United States v. Daniels, 932 F.3d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Rule 404(b)
usually applies to the government’s introduction of evidence against a defendant; however,
it can also apply in the opposite direction where a defendant wishes to introduce evidence
against a third party to exculpate himself.” (citing United States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504,
512 (8th Cir. 2014))); United States v. Alayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Rule
404(b) is most often used by prosecutors to introduce evidence of a criminal defendant’s
conduct that is not part of the charged crimes, but which is probative of the defendant’s
motive, intent, or identity with regard to the charged crime.” (citing United States v. Reed,
259 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2001))); United States v. Clark, 377 F. App’x 451, 458 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“Disputes over the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) usually concern
evidence of a criminal defendant’s past acts introduced by the prosecution.”); United States v.
Hayes, 219 F. App’x 114, 116 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The rule is usually applied in the context of
prosecution attempts to introduce ‘bad act’ evidence against a defendant.”).
Appellate courts have occasionally criticized prosecutors’ overuse of other acts evidence.
For example, the First Circuit has stated:
Despite the fairness implications of the prosecution’s use of prior bad act
evidence, the prosecution too often pushes the limits of admissibility of this
evidence, knowing its propensity power and gambling that the time constraints
on the trial court, the court’s broad discretion, the elasticity of Rule 404(b), and
the harmless error rule of the appellate court, will save it from the consequences
of overreaching.
United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 125 (1st Cir. 2000).
17. Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298–99 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding
evidence of prior convictions for assault was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) to prove the
defendant committed a different assault).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 142 F.3d 1301, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“This
circuit has long noted that the introduction of evidence of a prior conviction has the
potential for grave mischief because of its tendency to divert the attention of the jury from
the question of the defendant’s responsibility for the crime charged to the improper issue
of his bad character.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1995))); United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d
1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994) (“When jurors hear that a defendant has on earlier occasions
committed essentially the same crime as that for which he is on trial, the information
unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial impact. That, of course, is why the prosecution
uses such evidence whenever it can.”).
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Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion” that “presumes” the admission of
other acts evidence.20
Rule 404(b) is currently the subject of much discussion among federal
judges and academic commentators, as well as members of the federal
rules of evidence advisory committee.21 The current controversy about
the rule stems from the perception that the federal circuit courts of appeals
have set forth in their opinions approaches to Rule 404(b) that allow, if
not encourage, federal district court judges to erroneously admit other acts
evidence.22 For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently
issued an en banc opinion declaring that its previous approach to Rule 404(b)
had been too permissive, and that it was henceforth requiring a more
serious inquiry into the admissibility of other acts evidence.23 The Third
and Fourth Circuits have issued similar, if less definitive, panel opinions.24
These circuit court opinions are joined by numerous law review articles
observing that the admission of other acts evidence has become “routine”
and “commonplace” and arguing for some sort of reform of Rule 404(b).25

20. See infra Part III. Although the risk of unfair prejudice is the most important
reason why admission of other acts evidence is disfavored, two other reasons are that the
relevance of the other acts evidence is usually weak, because evidence that a person acted
violently once in the past does little to prove that the person acted violently on any
particular subsequent occasion, and that introduction of other acts evidence adds time and
risks distracting the jury. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of
Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 777–78 (1981).
21. Meeting Minutes from Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence 24 (May 3, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y9CE-KZ7S].
22. See infra Part IV.
23. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“We now
conclude that our circuit’s four-part test should be replaced by an approach that more closely
tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). For more discussion on Gomez, see infra Section
IV.C.
24. See United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 241 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v.
Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 277 (4th
Cir. 2017). These cases are discussed infra Sections IV.A–B.
25. See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Convictions Based on
Character: An Empirical Test of Other-Acts Evidence, 70 FLA. L. REV. 347, 352 (2018)
(“[T]he use of other-acts evidence has become incredibly common, if not the norm.”);
Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act
Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 3 (2016)
(“[C]ourt decisions resolving Rule 404(b) issues have been quite liberal in sustaining
theories of admissibility advanced by prosecutors, despite the fact that such admission
often violates the prohibition on the use of character evidence to prove conforming
conduct.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Criminal Minds: The Need to Refine the Application
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In 2017, the advisory committee considered several possible revisions to
Rule 404(b) that would require greater scrutiny of other acts evidence to
help ensure that district court judges exclude other acts evidence if offered
to prove character.26
The purpose of this Article is to examine how federal circuit courts of
appeals’ references to the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) have become
counterproductive to a faithful application of the rule. Specifically,
characterizing Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion” has led courts to imply
that the rule creates a presumption in favor of admissibility. As is discussed
in Part II, the structure of Rule 404(b) is inclusive, to the extent that the
rule prohibits other acts evidence for the purpose of proving propensity
but does not prohibit other acts evidence if offered for another purpose.
But as Part III demonstrates, many recent opinions of the federal circuit
courts of appeals contain references to Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure that
are misleading because they suggest that “inclusive” means “presumed
admissible.” Part IV discusses recent cases from several federal circuit
courts of appeals that recognize both the general problem of over-admitting
other acts evidence, as well as the specific problem of referring to Rule
404(b) as a “rule of inclusion.” Part V proposes that one way to improve
the federal courts’ application of Rule 404(b) is for the courts to shift their
focus from the inclusive structure of the rule and instead focus on the
exclusionary purpose of the rule.
II. RULE 404(B): A RULE OF INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, most
jurisdictions had developed, either through legislation or judicial decisionmaking, rules of evidence that prohibited the admission of other acts
of the Doctrine of Objective Chances as a Justification for Introducing Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence to Prove Intent, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851, 854 (2017) (“Most courts
take a lenient attitude toward the admission of such [uncharged misconduct] evidence to
prove intent.”); Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal
Trials, 47 GA. L. REV. 775, 779 (2013) (“[E]vidence that reveals the defendant’s criminal
past is frequently admitted.”); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt
and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 137 (1989) (“The
thesis of this Article is that extrinsic crime evidence has become so overused that cases in
which it is introduced have the ethos of a presumption of guilt rather than innocence.”).
The occasional judicial opinion also makes the point that district court judges are too
lenient in applying Rule 404(b), allowing the admission of other acts evidence without
sufficiently scrutinizing the proffered purpose. See, e.g., Gomez, 763 F.3d at 853 (“Especially
in drug cases like this one, other-act evidence is too often admitted almost automatically,
without consideration of the ‘legitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be used and
the need for it.’” (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012))).
26. See Conference on Possible Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b),
807, and 801(D)(1)(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1522–50 (2017).
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evidence except if offered for specifically permitted, non-character purposes.27
Other acts evidence has long been recognized as harmful because of the
risk that such evidence allows the government to prosecute—and juries to
convict—people on the basis of “who they are rather than what they have
done.”28 When offered against a criminal defendant, other acts evidence
—especially evidence of a prior conviction—risks two kinds of unfair
prejudice: first, that a jury will think that the defendant is the kind of person
who engages in criminal conduct, and second, that a jury will think that
the defendant is generally a bad person who deserves to be found guilty.29

27. Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1547, 1557 (1998); see also Thomas J. Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule in
Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 303–04 (1982) (“The simple
exclusionary rule persisted in this pristine form in most federal decisions until the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). As one scholar has explained:
This inclusionary approach stands in contrast to the “traditional,” exclusionary
rule that would only admit what would otherwise be character evidence if its
logical relevance fell within a list of well-defined exceptions. It has been argued
that the exclusionary formulation of the character evidence rule is the only
approach that is faithful to the origins of the rule, both in the common law of the
United States and, even earlier, in the common law of England.
Melilli, supra, at 1557 (footnotes omitted).
28. See Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (“The Rule reflects the revered and longstanding
policy that, under our system of justice, an accused is tried for what he did, not who he
is.”); Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 404(b) was born of
the common law in an effort to protect parties from wrongful inferences derived from
character evidence.”); United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“Because evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts carries with it the inherent potential
to see the defendant simply as a bad person and then to convict because of who he is rather
than what he did, a trial court must take appropriate care to see that this does not happen.”);
United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“A concomitant of the
presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he
is.” (quoting United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985))); United
States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 955 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (“404(b) is often thought to
protect a defendant from being tried ‘for who he is,’ not for ‘what he did.’” (quoting United
States v. Bradley, 5 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d
201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972) (“Showing that a man is generally bad has never been under our
system allowable. The defendant has a right to be tried on the truth of the specific charge
contained in the indictment.”); see also Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of
Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1961) (“Evidence of the accused’s
past criminal history—prior convictions at trial, pleas of guilty, acquittals for technical
reasons, arrests, and police or private suspicions—have traditionally been viewed with distrust
in Anglo-American law.”).
29. See United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982) (“This rule codifies
the common law doctrine forbidding the prosecution from asking the jury to infer from the
fact that the defendant has committed a bad act in the past, that he has a bad character and
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The historical approach to other acts evidence recognized these risks and
limited admission of this evidence to specific non-character purposes.30
Rather than codifying the historical approach to character evidence and
allowing other acts evidence to be admitted only for specific purposes, the
Federal Rules of Evidence instead adopted a rule that makes other acts
evidence inadmissible only for the purpose of proving action in accordance
with character.31 This change from an “exclusive” to an “inclusive” structure
has been interpreted by many scholars as intended to make other acts evidence
more broadly admissible—but only to the extent that under the “inclusive”
rule, the proponent of other acts evidence need not “pigeonhole” the
evidence into one of a limited number of permitted purposes but may seek
admission of the evidence for the purpose of proving anything other than
propensity.32

therefore is more likely to have committed the bad act now charged. Although this
‘propensity evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than
those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person
deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.”);
see also United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979) (“Two concerns are
expressed by the first sentence of Rule 404(b): (1) that the jury may convict a ‘bad man’
who deserves to be punished—not because he is guilty of the crime charged but because
of his prior or subsequent misdeeds; and (2) that the jury will infer that because the accused
committed other crimes, he probably committed the crime charged.”).
30. See Melilli, supra note 27, at 1557.
31. See id.
32. See United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2010); Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688–89 (1988); see also Bruce D. Landrum, Military Rule
of Evidence 404(b): Toothless Giant of the Evidence World, 150 MIL. L. REV. 271, 284
(1995) (“The legislative history . . . amply demonstrates that the intent of this rule is to admit
more uncharged misconduct evidence than the old exclusionary approach.” (citing EDWARD
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:30 (1984). The Third Circuit has
explained:
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. . . . The rule codified
the common law bar against the use of uncharged crimes to prove criminal propensity
—albeit in a modified form. The common law rule was widely, though not
universally, stated in “exclusionary” terms. That is, it set forth a general rule of
inadmissibility, subject to exceptions, such as res gestae. By contrast, Rule 404(b)
was “inclusionary.” It stated a general rule of admissibility, subject to a single
exception—evidence of other wrongful acts was admissible so long as it was not
introduced solely to prove criminal propensity. Thus, the proponent no longer had
to pigeonhole his evidence into one of the established common-law exceptions,
on pain of exclusion. If he could identify any non-propensity purpose for
introducing the evidence, it was admissible.
Green, 617 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated:
The House made clear that the version of Rule 404(b) which became law was
intended to “place greater emphasis on admissibility than did the final Court
version.” The Senate echoed this theme: “The use of the discretionary word
‘may’ with respect to the admissibility of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other
acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge.” Thus,
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Given the multitude of federal circuit court opinions that use the
inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) to make unwarranted inferences about
admissibility,33 it cannot be stressed too strongly that even though the
framework of the current rule was meant to make other acts evidence more
readily admissible by allowing the evidence to be admitted for any nonprohibited purpose, the inclusive structure of the rule says nothing else
about whether evidence in any particular case should be admitted.34 As
reflected in the opinions of the federal circuit courts of appeals, the current
understanding of the rule as “inclusive” has expanded far beyond broadening
the potential non-prohibited purposes, such that federal courts currently
are using references to the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) to suggest—
or even, as in the Eighth Circuit, to assert explicitly—that this structure
creates a presumption in favor of admitting other acts evidence.35
This Article accepts the premise that the inclusive structure of Rule
404(b) was meant to make other acts evidence more readily admissible,
to the extent that evidence is not excluded by the rule so long as it is not
offered for the single prohibited purpose of proving action in accordance
with character. However, this structure should not be interpreted as any
sort of presumption in favor of admissibility. Neither an inclusive structure
nor an exclusive structure creates any presumption regarding admissibility.
Regardless of structure, a trial judge should begin a 404(b) inquiry from
the neutral position that if the evidence is offered for the purpose of
proving propensity, it is inadmissible,36 but if the evidence is offered for
another purpose, it is not inadmissible under Rule 404(b)37—but of course
could still be inadmissible under another rule, such as Rule 403.38 The
Congress was not nearly so concerned with the potential prejudicial effect
of Rule 404(b) evidence as it was with ensuring that restrictions would not be
placed on the admission of such evidence.
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688–89 (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1973); then citing
S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 24 (1974)).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See generally FED R. EVID. 404(b).
35. See infra Part III.
36. FED R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
37. FED R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
38. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 403. Rule 404(b) does not include consideration of
unfair prejudice. See FED R. EVID. 404(b). Instead, whether other acts evidence is too
unfairly prejudicial to be admitted depends on the application of Rule 403, which excludes
evidence only when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 403. The argument that the balancing test that Rule 403 provides
is inadequate to protect against the unfair prejudice of other acts evidence has been
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decision whether other acts evidence is admissible does not properly
include any presumption that the evidence is offered for a permitted, nonpropensity purpose. If any presumption were to properly apply, that
presumption arguably should be that the evidence is inadmissible, given
the inherent prejudice of all other acts evidence.39
advanced by several scholars. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Character
Assassination: Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to Protect Criminal
Defendants, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 820–21 (2018) (proposing a Rule 404(b)-specific
revision that would require “the probative value of other acts offered against a criminal
defendant to outweigh the potential for prejudice”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to
Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (1985) (“Before the judge admits evidence for such
a purpose, the proponent of the evidence must persuade the judge that the probative value
of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.”); Richard B. Kuhns, The
Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV.
777, 807 (1981) (“[T]his proposed balancing test would permit the admission of specific
acts evidence only if its probative value outweighs the countervailing factors.”); D. Craig
Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial
Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 356 (1989) (noting the “proadmission bias of the present Rule 403” and proposing a general revision to Rule 403).
39. All other acts evidence is inherently prejudicial because even when admitted
for a proper, non-propensity purpose, the risk is always present that a jury will make the
prohibited propensity inference on its own. See United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 702,
707 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit explained: “The prior acts used to show intent
to distribute narcotics are often prior drug dealings, and it can be easy for jurors to slide
across Rule 404(b)’s slippery boundary between proper consideration of intent and
improper consideration of propensity.” Id. Many courts have recognized this inherent
prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d 956, 974 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Extrinsic
evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is inherently prejudicial to the defendant because
it risks a jury’s convicting the defendant for the extrinsic offense or conduct rather than
the charged one.”); United States v. Pierson, 544 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ll
Rule 404(b) evidence is inherently prejudicial . . . .” (quoting United States v. Cook, 454
F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2006))); United States v. Lucero, 601 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir.
1979) (referring to “the potential prejudice that is always inherent in evidence of a
defendant’s prior uncharged crimes or wrongs” (citing United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d
846, 849 (10th Cir. 1978))); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“Even though such [other acts] evidence is relevant, because a man of bad character is
more likely to commit a crime than one not, the principle prohibits such evidence because
it is inherently prejudicial.”).
Limiting instructions can potentially reduce this risk, but the efficacy of limiting
instructions is uncertain. See United States v. Gomez, 712 F.3d 1146, 1162 (7th Cir. 2013)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“As a general matter, one can question how useful such limiting
instructions are when a jury might easily slide toward the forbidden propensity inference
in its use of Rule 404(b) evidence.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s
note to 1972 proposed rules (suggesting that courts consider “the probable effectiveness
or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction”).
When discussing other acts evidence, circuit court opinions occasionally misstate the
Rule 403 balancing test as requiring that the probative value of other acts evidence outweigh
the risk of unfair prejudice; these misstatements might be considered Freudian slips,
betraying an unconscious recognition that the correct Rule 403 balancing test is inadequate
as applied to other acts evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Lin, 131 F. App’x 884, 887
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The current approach of most federal circuit courts of appeals to the
application of Rule 404(b) is flawed because these courts have used the
inclusive structure of the rule as a basis for creating a presumption that
other acts evidence is admissible.40 The following sections examine this
flawed approach.
III. MISCONSTRUING THE MEANING OF INCLUSION
A. Explicit Assertion of a Presumption
The most obviously incorrect use of Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure
to create a presumption of admissibility is found in the opinions of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. These opinions explicitly assert that the
inclusive structure of the rule creates a presumption in favor of the admissibility
of other acts evidence. For example, one recent opinion states: “We have
described Rule 404(b) as ‘a rule of inclusion, meaning that evidence
offered for permissible purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary
determination.’”41 Identical or nearly identical statements are found in
numerous recent opinions.42
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Evidence that is properly admitted under Rule 404(b) must therefore be
relevant to a proper purpose, and its probative value must outweigh the prejudice that is
inherent in this kind of evidence.” (citing United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 294
(3d Cir. 1999))); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In
determining whether evidence of Arambula’s prior conviction was properly admitted under
Rule 404(b), . . . we must analyze the evidence pursuant to Rule 403 and determine whether its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.” (citing United States v. Houser, 929 F.2d
1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990))); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1259 (6th Cir. 1985)
(“Before admitting prior acts evidence, the district court must determine that the evidence
is admissible for a proper purpose and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its potential prejudicial effects.”).
40. See Capra & Richter, supra note 38, at 786 (“Appellate courts routinely start from a
faulty premise that Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion,’ which presumes admissibility of
other-acts evidence.”).
41. United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1142 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Walker, 428 F.3d 1165, 1169 (8th Cir. 2005)).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 867 F.3d 1021, 1029 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Rule
404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and, as such, if ‘evidence is offered for permissible purposes
it is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.’” (quoting United States v.
Horton, 756 F.3d 569, 579 (8th Cir. 2014))); United States v. Contreras, 816 F.3d 502, 511
(8th Cir. 2016) (“Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion, such that evidence offered for permissible
purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.” (quoting United States
v. Williams, 796 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2015))). District courts in the Eighth Circuit repeat
this “presumption” language in their written rulings on motions in limine. See, e.g., United
States v. Lussier, No. 18-CR-281 (NEB/LIB), 2019 WL 2489906, at *1 (D. Minn. June 15,
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The Eighth Circuit’s often-repeated language connecting Rule 404(b)’s
inclusive structure with a presumption of admissibility is an objectively
incorrect interpretation of Rule 404(b). If other acts evidence is “offered
for permissible purposes,” then the evidence is not excluded by Rule
404(b)—but just because the evidence is not excluded by this rule does
not mean that the evidence is “presumed admissible.”43 Rule 404(b) does
not create any presumptions about admissibility; the rule simply excludes
other acts evidence if offered to prove action in accordance with character
while not excluding the evidence if offered for another purpose.44
The Eighth Circuit does perhaps try to qualify its assertion that Rule
404(b)’s inclusive structure creates a presumption of admissibility by adding
the words “absent a contrary determination,”45 but the intended effect of
those words is unclear. A presumption generally can be overcome by a
“contrary determination,”46 so the court’s failure to explain what it means
by a “contrary determination” in this context leaves the reader with an
essentially unqualified assertion that other acts evidence is “presumed
admissible.”47
The “presumed admissible” language in the Eighth Circuit’s recent opinions
is not accompanied by any further analysis of the rule to explain how or
why this asserted presumption arises. The case in which the presumption
language first appears, and which is still cited in support of current
assertions of a presumption of admissibility, is the 2004 case United States
v. Smith.48 In this case, the court offered only a slightly more detailed
explanation for its assertion that the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b)
2019) (“Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion, such that evidence offered for permissible
purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.’” (quoting United States
v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 2006))); United States v. Vaca, No. 4:18-CR00140-01-DGK, 2018 WL 6069171, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2018) (“Rule 404(b) is
a rule of inclusion, and, as such, if evidence is offered for permissible purposes it is presumed
admissible absent a contrary determination.” (quoting Davis, 867 F.3d at 1029)); United
States v. Monds, No. 4:17-cr-00170 – JEG, 2018 WL 9945328, at *2 (S.D. Iowa July 5,
2018) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and, as such, if evidence is offered for permissible
purposes it is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.” (alterations omitted)
(quoting Davis, 867 F.3d at 1029)).
43. Davis, 867 F.3d at 1029.
44. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Rule
404(b) excludes relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if the purpose is to show a
person’s propensity to behave in a certain way, but other-act evidence may be admitted for
‘another purpose’ including, but not limited to, ‘proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID.
404(b))).
45. Davis, 867 F.3d at 1029.
46. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 837 (2001) (“Presumptions, by their very nature, can be overcome by contrary evidence.”).
47. Davis, 867 F.3d at 1029.
48. 383 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2004).
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creates a presumption of admissibility.49 In addressing the argument of
Smith, who was appealing his conviction for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, that the district court had erroneously allowed the
government to present evidence that Smith had been involved in other
uncharged drug transactions, the court stated:
Because Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, we presume that evidence of “other
crimes, acts, or wrongs” is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, unless
the party seeking its exclusion can demonstrate that it serves only to prove the
defendant’s criminal disposition. Other crimes evidence is admissible if it
is relevant to a material issue, the other crimes are similar and reasonably close
in time to the charged crime, the evidence is sufficient to support a jury’s finding
that the defendant committed the other crimes, and the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.50

The court then proceeded to summarily reject Smith’s argument that the
district court erred in admitting the other acts evidence. Critically, the court
failed to consider that the uncharged drug offenses might be relevant to
the question whether Smith was guilty of the presently charged drug offense
only because the evidence invited the jury to conclude that Smith was the
kind of person who engaged in dealing drugs.51 The Smith case thus suggests
to district court judges in the Eighth Circuit that they should look only
at the surface of other acts evidence and rely on the inclusive structure of
Rule 404(b) to find that the evidence is admissible.52 The district courts
in the Eighth Circuit often repeat the “presumed admissible” language in their
decisions regarding 404(b) evidence.53 And underscoring the suggestion

49. Id. at 706.
50. Id. (first citing United States v. Campa-Fabela, 210 F.3d 837, 840 (8th Cir.
2000); and then citing United States v. Carroll, 207 F.3d 465, 469 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000)).
This case misstates the proper application of Rule 404(b) in an additional way: by asserting
that the “party seeking exclusion” bears the burden of proving that the evidence is offered
for a prohibited purpose. Id.; see infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text for discussion
of similar burden shifting.
51. See Smith, 383 F.3d at 706 (asserting that the other acts evidence “was clearly
relevant to a material issue (Smith’s knowledge of drug dealing)”).
52. See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Lussier, No. 18-CR-281 (NEB/LIB), 2019 WL
2489906, at *1 (D. Minn. June 15, 2019) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, such that
evidence offered for permissible purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary
determination.” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 2006)));
United States v. Vaca, No. 4:18-CR-00140-01-DGK, 2018 WL 6069171, at *1 (W.D. Mo.
Nov. 20, 2018) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and, as such, if evidence is offered for
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that other acts evidence should be presumed admissible is the fact that the
Eighth Circuit—like all of the federal circuit courts of appeals—rarely
finds that a district court erred in admitting other acts evidence.54
B. Almost Explicit Assertions of a Presumption
Although the Eighth Circuit’s “presumed admissible” language is the
most obviously incorrect way that the federal circuit courts have misused
Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure to create a presumption of admissibility,
several other federal circuit courts of appeals have come as close as
possible to an explicit assertion of a presumption of admissibility without
using the word “presumed.” Instead, these courts have said that Rule 404(b)
“favors the admission” or “emphasizes the admissibility” of other acts
evidence.55 The Third and Eleventh Circuits have used the “favors
permissible purposes it is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.” (quoting
United States v. Davis, 867 F.3d 1021, 1029 (8th Cir. 2017))).
54. Given the exceedingly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard of review that
applies to trial judges’ decisions to admit or exclude evidence, the appellate courts often
decline to even engage in any meaningful analysis of these decisions. See, e.g., United
States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Appellants who challenge
evidentiary rulings of the district court are like rich men who wish to enter the Kingdom;
their prospects compare with those of camels who wish to pass through the eye of a
needle.”); United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Given the wide
discretion permitted the district judge, it is fruitless to contend that the evidence was
improperly admitted.”); see also Lewis, supra note 38, at 343 (“The defendant aggrieved
by the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence has, of course, the right to appeal the
ruling. However, the chance of success on the issue is remote.”); Jim Gash, Punitive
Damages, Other Acts Evidence, and the Constitution, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1223–24
(“Because of the intensely factual nature of Rule 404(b) determinations, appellate review
of such rulings is highly deferential to the trial court; appellate courts have variously
characterized the trial court action needed to warrant a reversal as ‘an abuse of discretion,’
‘a clear abuse of discretion,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘irrational;’ admitting other acts evidence that
‘has no bearing on any issue in the case’ also warrants reversal.”) (citing 2 EDWARD
IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 9:81, at 9-232 to 9-234 (2003)).
Occasionally the appellate courts have referred to the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b)
as linked to the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Stefanyuk, 944
F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion; the district court has
broad discretion to admit Rule 404(b) evidence.”); United States v. Walker, 789 F. App’x
241, 244 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Trial courts have broad discretion in admitting evidence under this
Court’s inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b).” (citing United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d
138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009))). Although such statements are correct to the extent that the district
court almost always has “broad discretion” to admit evidence, this discretion has nothing
to do with the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b).
55. See United States v. Carswell, 178 F. App’x 1009, 1013 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Rule
404(b) ‘is a rule of inclusion.’ Both the ‘rules and practice favor the admission of evidence
rather than its exclusion if it has any probative value at all.’” (citation omitted) (first
quoting United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2005); and then quoting
Young v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 618 F.2d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 1980))); United States v.
DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Rule 404(b) is inclusive, not exclusive, and

392

58-2_POST_KLEIN_PAGES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 379, 2021]

5/27/2021 2:38 PM

Inclusion Confusion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

admissibility” language in connection with Rule 404(b)’s structure to imply
a presumption of admissibility.56 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has
stated: “Rule 404(b) ‘is a rule of inclusion.’ Both the ‘rules and practice
favor the admission of evidence rather than its exclusion if it has any
probative value at all.’”57 Similarly, the Third Circuit has stated:
“We have recognized that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than of
exclusion.” And we favor the admission of other criminal conduct if such
evidence is “relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity
or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.”58

The Third Circuit is also the primary user of the “emphasizes admissibility”
language.59 For example, the court has stated: “Rule 404(b) is a rule of
inclusion, not exclusion, which emphasizes the admissibility of other crimes
evidence.”60
As used most recently,61 the “favors” and “emphasizes” language
is disconnected from any historical context. However, these statements
emphasizes admissibility.” (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir.
1992))).
56. See Carswell, 178 F. App’x at 1013; DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 563.
57. Carswell, 178 F. App’x at 1013 (citations omitted) (first quoting Baker, 432
F.3d at 1204–05; and then quoting Young, 618 F.2d at 337).
58. United States v. Wiktorchik, 525 F. App’x 201, 204 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted) (first quoting United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994); and then
quoting United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765 (3d Cir. 1978)); accord United States v.
Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We have recognized that ‘Rule 404(b) is a rule
of inclusion rather than exclusion.’ In general, we favor the admission of Rule 404(b)
evidence when it is relevant for any other purpose than to show the defendant’s propensity
to commit the charged offense.” (citations omitted) (quoting and citing United States v.
Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003))); United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 395 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“We have recognized that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion. We favor the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if such
evidence is ‘relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition
on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Long, 574
F.2d at 765)).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 728 (3d Cir. 2013)
60. Id. (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1990)); accord
DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 563 (“Rule 404(b) ‘is inclusive, not exclusive, and emphasizes
admissibility.’” (quoting Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886)); United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170,
186 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Nevertheless, Rule 404(b) ‘is inclusive, not exclusive, and emphasizes
admissibility.’” (quoting Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886)).
61. Both of these courts seem to have stopped using the “favors” and “emphasizes”
language in recent opinions. Although the federal circuit courts have not used this language in
recent cases, some district courts within these circuits have continued to use this language.
See, e.g., Naranjo v. Lowden, No. 17-1291, 2019 WL 2327708, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 31,
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about the implications of Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure appear to have
originated as part of extended discussions about the enactment of the rule
in 1975,62 and as presented within this context did not necessarily imply a
presumption about the admissibility of other acts evidence. For example,
the case that appears to have first used the inclusive structure of Rule
404(b) in connection with the “emphasizes admissibility” language is the
1978 case United States v. Long, decided by the Third Circuit.63 In this
case, the court wrote: “The draftsmen of Rule 404(b) intended it to be
construed as one of ‘inclusion,’ and not ‘exclusion.’ They intended to
emphasize admissibility of ‘other crime’ evidence. This emerges from the
legislative history which saw the ‘exclusionary’ approach of the Supreme
Court version of Rule 404(b) modified.”64 In this context, it is possible to
interpret the connection the court makes between the rule’s inclusive structure
and the emphasis on admissibility to mean that under the then-newly enacted
rule, the proponent of the other acts evidence did not need to “pigeonhole”
the evidence into a specific exception in order for the evidence to be admissible.
In later cases, however, courts have used the “inclusive” and “emphasizes
admissibility” language without providing any historical context,65 with a
resulting implication that the rule’s inclusive structure means that other acts
evidence should be presumed admissible. Examples of cases that illustrate
the progression of the Third Circuit’s use of this language include:




From 1988: “The drafters contemplated that Rule 404(b)
would be construed as a rule of ‘inclusion’ rather than ‘exclusion.’
‘They intended to emphasize admissibility of “other crime”
evidence.’ The possible uses of other crimes evidence listed
in the Rule—motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake—are not the
only proper ones.”66
From 1991: “The drafters intended that Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
be construed as a rule of ‘inclusion’ rather than one of
‘exclusion’ in order to emphasize the admissibility of otheracts evidence.”67

2019) (“Rule 404(b) ‘is inclusive, not exclusive, and emphasizes admissibility.’” (quoting
DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 563)).
62. See Long, 574 F.2d at 765–66.
63. 574 F.2d 761.
64. Id. at 766.
65. See, e.g., Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 728; DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 563.
66. United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)
(first quoting Long, 574 F.3d at 766; and then quoting United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1050 (3d Cir. 1982)).
67. Gov’t of V.I. v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 419 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Long, 574 F.3d
at 766).
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From 2013: “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion,
which emphasizes the admissibility of other crimes evidence.”68
C. Implicit Assertions of a Presumption

While the assertions that Rule 404(b) “presumes” or “favors” or
“emphasizes” the admissibility of other acts evidence are the most directly
misleading statements that the federal circuit courts of appeals have made
about the rule’s inclusive structure, the courts have also used other language
in connection with “inclusive” to create a more subtle implication of
admissibility. For example, opinions from most of the federal circuit courts
of appeals have included statements that other acts evidence is admissible
“unless” or “so long as” the “only” or “sole” purpose is not to prove propensity.69
Such statements are potentially misleading because they imply that the
starting point of a Rule 404(b) analysis is to assume that the evidence
is admissible.70
One linguistic formulation that some of the federal circuit courts use
that implies a presumption of admissibility is to state that other acts evidence
is admissible “unless” propensity is the “only” purpose for which the
evidence could have been admitted.71 For example, the Eleventh Circuit
recently stated: “We have explained that Rule 404(b) is a rule ‘of inclusion
which allows extrinsic evidence unless it tends to prove only criminal
propensity.’”72 The problem with this “unless . . . only” language is that
it suggests that other acts evidence should be regarded as admissible unless
the opponent of the evidence has proven that the evidence is relevant only
for the prohibited purpose of proving propensity. Instead, the correct approach
to Rule 404(b) should begin with the words of 404(b)(1) that “other acts
evidence is inadmissible.”73 This evidence should remain inadmissible

68. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 728 (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267,
270 (3d Cir. 1990)).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019).
70. This implication is wrong because the starting point of a Rule 404(b) analysis
should be that the other acts evidence is inadmissible and remains inadmissible unless the
proponent can explain how the evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose, in a way
that does not involve any inferences about character.
71. See, e.g., Hano, 922 F.3d at 1291.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012)).
73. Rule 404(b)(1) states: “Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
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unless the proponent can explain how the evidence is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose, in a way that does not involve any inferences about
character.
A statement that other acts evidence is admissible “unless” the opposing
party persuades the district court judge that the evidence is being offered
“only” for the prohibited purpose of proving character is problematic not
only because it erroneously implies a presumption of admissibility but also
because it reverses the burden of proof under Rule 404(b). It is generally
agreed that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponent of the
evidence has the burden of proving that the requirements of admissibility
are met.74 With respect to Rule 404(b), this means that the proponent of
other acts evidence has the burden of persuading the district court judge
that the evidence is being offered for a non-propensity purpose.75 The
“admissible unless” language implicitly places the burden on the opponent of
the evidence to persuade the district court judge that the evidence is being
offered “only” for the prohibited purpose.76
74. See DANIEL J. CAPRA, CASE LAW DIVERGENCE FROM THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 18–19 (2000), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/caselawd_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DP8T-EK6K] (“[I]n Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the Court
held that the party seeking to admit the evidence—the proponent—generally has the burden of
proving that the admissibility requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence are
met.”); United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Our opinions have
repeatedly and consistently emphasized that the burden of identifying a proper purpose
rests with the proponent of the evidence, usually the government.”); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.23(5)(b) (Mark S. Brodin,
ed., 2d ed. 1997) (“Once the question of admissibility has been raised, the party offering
the evidence has the burden of convincing the court that it is relevant to a consequential
fact in issue other than propensity, and that Rule 403 does not require exclusion.”).
75. Outside of the “unless . . . only” context, the federal circuit courts appear to
agree that the proponent of the evidence has the burden to persuade the trial judge that the
evidence is offered for a non-propensity purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Jones,
930 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The burden is on the government to demonstrate that
a ‘prior conviction is relevant and admissible under 404(b).’” (quoting United States v.
Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 494 (5th Cir. 2014))); United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 176
(3d Cir. 2019) (“As the party seeking admission of evidence under Rule 404(b), Vederman
bore ‘the burden of demonstrating its applicability’ and ‘identifying a proper purpose.’”
(quoting Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276)); United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 266 (4th Cir.
2017) (“The government bears the burden of establishing that evidence of a defendant’s
prior bad acts is admissible for a proper purpose.” (citing United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d
1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 602–03 (9th
Cir. 1993))).
76. Courts referring to Rule 404(b) as inclusive occasionally explicitly switch the
burden. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 439 F.3d 934, 941 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Rule
404(b) is a rule of inclusion, so we presume that evidence of other crimes is admissible for
one of the listed purposes unless the party seeking to exclude the evidence can show that
it serves only to prove the defendant’s criminal disposition.” (citing United States v. Hill,
410 F.3d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 2005))); United States v. Plumman, 409 F.3d 919, 928 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“Because Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, we presume that evidence of ‘other
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The risk that using the language of “admissible unless . . . only” will cause
courts to place the burden of proving inadmissibility on the opponent of
other acts evidence is illustrated by a statement of the Tenth Circuit, which
wrongly reasoned that the adoption of Rule 404(b) changed the starting point
for determining the admissibility of other acts evidence from “exclusion
unless” proven admissible by the government to “admission unless” proven
inadmissible by the defendant:
We have commented before on the changes brought about by Rule 404 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and noted the change from the starting position of
exclusion “unless” to admission “unless.” This is a significant change and is important
in the examination of cases decided before the change in the Rules. The defendants
have not demonstrated that any “unless” element is present to overcome the
“admission.”77

Of course, contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s statement, the starting point
remains “exclusion unless”; other acts evidence should be excluded unless
the proponent of the evidence demonstrates that it is being offered for a
non-propensity purpose. Or in the exact words of Rule 404(b)(1): “Prohibited
Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove
a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.”78 It is hard to imagine
how the rule could be clearer that the starting point is “not admissible”
than by starting with the words “prohibited uses.”
An additional problem with the “unless . . . only” formulation is that the
use of the word “only” implies that it will be the rare or exceptional case
in which other acts evidence is being offered for the prohibited purpose.79

crimes, acts, or wrongs’ is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, unless the party seeking its exclusion
can demonstrate that it serves only to prove the defendant’s criminal disposition.” (quoting
United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2004))).
77. United States v. Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting United
States v. Tisdale, 647 F.2d 91, 93 (10th Cir. 1981)). The court additionally tied its perception
that under the current rule, other acts evidence is “admissible unless” to the rule’s inclusive
structure: “Thus, Rule 404(b) is not exclusionary, and allows admission of uncharged wrongs
unless they are introduced solely to prove a defendant’s criminal disposition.” Id. (citing
United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir. 1977)).
78. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Castiello, 915 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The most
striking aspect of Evidence Rule 404(b) is its inclusive rather than exclusionary nature:
should the evidence prove relevant in any other way it is admissible, subject only to the
rarely invoked limitations of Rule 403.” (quoting United States v. Zeuli, 725 F.2d 813,
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This implication is inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 404(b), which
is to broadly exclude evidence that risks jury verdicts that are based on
assumptions about character.80
Statements that suggest to district court judges that because Rule 404(b)
is “inclusive,” they should presume that other acts evidence is admissible
“unless” the “only” purpose for admitting the evidence is to prove character
are found in the opinions of many federal circuit courts of appeals. The
following list provides recent examples from the circuit courts of appeals
that use this formulation most often:81
816 (1st Cir. 1984))); United States v. Donovan, 984 F.2d 507, 512 (1st Cir. 1993)
(referring to “the well-settled concept that Rule 404(b) is not to be read grudgingly”).
80. See Joan L. Larsen, Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning:
The Accused’s Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule
404(b), 87 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 678 (1993) (“Rule 404(b)’s high barriers to the admissibility of
specific acts evidence were designed in order to protect the defendant from the grave ‘risk
that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it
will convict anyway because a bad man deserves punishment.’” (quoting United States v.
Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1986))).
81. The First Circuit has largely avoided the temptation to characterize Rule 404(b)
as “inclusive,” and indeed has recognized that whether the rule is “inclusive” or “exclusive” is
essentially irrelevant. See United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 125 n.11 (1st Cir.
2000) (“Because of its many exceptions to the general statement that prior bad act evidence
should not be admitted, Rule 404(b) is sometimes understood as one of inclusion, and
sometimes as one of exclusion. Whatever the proper formulation, the exceptions must not
swallow the rule.” (citations omitted)).
The Fourth Circuit has generally avoided using the “unless . . . only” language, although
it has used other language to imply that Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure creates a presumption
of admissibility. See United States v. Briley, 770 F.3d 267, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2014).
The Fifth Circuit has largely avoided making the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) a
factor in its application of the rule, especially in recent cases. Some older cases do, though,
use the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) to suggest a presumption in favor of admissibility.
See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 386 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 404 is a rule of
inclusion, which admits evidence of other acts relevant to a trial issue except where such
evidence tends to prove only criminal disposition. The rule is exclusionary only as to
evidence admitted to establish bad character as such; it very broadly recognizes admissibility
of prior crimes for other purposes.” (citations omitted) (first citing United States v. Halper,
590 F.2d 422, 432 (2d Cir. 1978); and then citing United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144,
1147 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1978))).
The Sixth Circuit has occasionally observed that 404(b) is a “rule of inclusion” but has
not used that structure as a basis for implying a presumption in favor of admitting other
acts evidence. See, e.g., United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428, 446 (6th Cir. 2017)
(“Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion rather than exclusion.’” (quoting United States v.
Carney, 387 F.3d 436, 450 n.11 (6th Cir. 2004))).
The Seventh Circuit has avoided references to the structure of Rule 404(b).
The D.C. Circuit has avoided using the inclusive structure of 404(b) in its recent opinions,
although some older opinions do use the structure to suggest a sort of presumption in favor
of admissibility. See, e.g., United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 946 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“[W]e have described the rule as one ‘of inclusion rather than exclusion,’ and explained
that it excludes only evidence that ‘is offered for the sole purpose of proving that a person’s
actions conformed to his or her character.’” (first quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d
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Second Circuit: “Under our ‘inclusionary’ approach, all
‘other act’ evidence is generally admissible unless it serves
the sole purpose of showing a defendant’s bad character.”82
Third Circuit: “Rule 404 is a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion, and evidence should be admitted unless used merely
to show propensity or disposition of the defendant to commit
the crime.”83
Eighth Circuit: Rule 404(b) “is one ‘of inclusion rather than
exclusion and admits evidence of other crimes or acts relevant
to any issue in the trial, unless it tends to prove only criminal
disposition.’”84

923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000); and then quoting Unites States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 661
(D.C. Cir. 2003))); Long, 328 F.3d at 660–61 (“‘Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather
than exclusion,’ and it is ‘quite permissive,’ excluding evidence only if it is offered for the
sole purpose of proving that a person’s actions conformed to his or her character.” (quoting
Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929–30)).
82. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing United States
v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also United States v. Flom, 763 F. App’x
27, 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (“This Court ‘follows the “inclusionary” approach to “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts” evidence, under which such evidence is admissible unless it is introduced
for the sole purpose of showing the defendant’s bad character, or unless it is overly
prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403 or not relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402.’” (quoting
United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996))); United States v. Memoli, 648
F. App’x 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2016) (“This Circuit has adopted an inclusionary approach to
other act evidence under Rule 404(b), which allows such evidence to be admitted for any
purpose other than to demonstrate criminal propensity.” (quoting United States v. Scott,
677 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2012))); United States v. Lasher, 661 F. App’x 25, 28 (2d Cir.
2016) (“This Circuit has adopted an inclusionary approach to other act evidence under
Rule 404(b), which allows such evidence to be admitted for any purpose other than to
demonstrate criminal propensity.” (quoting Scott, 677 F.3d at 79); United States v.
Graham, 504 F. App’x 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Generally, ‘we have adopted an inclusionary
approach to evaluating Rule 404(b) evidence, which allows evidence to be received at trial
for any purpose other than to attempt to demonstrate the defendant’s criminal propensity.’”
(quoting United States v. Edwards 342 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2003))).
83. United States v. Smith, 505 F. App’x 149, 152–53 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259,
264 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Rule 404(b) was ‘inclusionary.’ It stated a general rule of admissibility, subject to a single
exception—evidence of other wrongful acts was admissible so long as it was not introduced
solely to prove criminal propensity.”).
84. United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 538 (8th Cir. 2010); accord United States v. Simon, 767
F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Ninth Circuit: “As we have indicated in prior cases, Rule
404(b) is ‘a rule of inclusion; unless the evidence of other
crimes tends only to prove propensity, it is admissible.’”85
Tenth Circuit: “We have held that Rule 404(b) is a rule of
inclusion, and we regularly affirm the admission of other-acts
evidence unless it tends to prove only a criminal propensity.”86
Eleventh Circuit: “Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion which
allows extrinsic evidence unless it tends to prove only criminal
propensity.”87

Although the “unless . . . only” formulation is perhaps the most common
way that the federal circuit courts have implied that the inclusive structure
of Rule 404(b) creates a presumption of admissibility, the federal circuit
courts have also offered other linguistic constructions that imply that the
starting point of a Rule 404(b) analysis is a presumption that the evidence
is admissible. The Tenth Circuit’s most typical language is “all,” “except,”
and “only.”88 For example, the court recently stated: “Rule 404(b) is
considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes
or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.”89 The
85. Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996)); accord United
States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 404(b) ‘is a rule of inclusion—
not exclusion.’ ‘Once it has been established that the evidence offered serves one of’ the
purposes authorized by Rule 404(b)(2), ‘the only conditions justifying the exclusion of the
evidence are those described in Rule 403.’” (quoting United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d
935, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc))); United States v. Fierro, 450 F. App’x 586, 587 (9th Cir.
2011) (“Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion’ and ‘unless the evidence of other crimes tends
only to prove propensity, it is admissible.’” (quoting United States v. Rrapi, 175 F.3d 742,
748 (9th Cir. 1999))).
86. United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1035 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Smalls,
752 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2014) (“This rule ‘is one of inclusion, rather than exclusion,
unless the evidence is introduced for the impermissible purpose or is unduly prejudicial.’”
(quoting United States v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014, 1022 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds as recognized in United States v. Hathaway, 318 F.3d 1001, 1006 (10th Cir. 2003))).
87. United States v. Donelson, 797 F. App’x 496, 497 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012)); accord United States v.
Ruiz, 701 F. App’x 871, 874 (11th Cir. 2017) (“We have explained that ‘Rule 404(b)
is one of inclusion which allows extrinsic evidence unless it tends to prove only criminal
propensity.’” (quoting Sanders, 668 F.3d at 1314)); United States v. Johnson, 615 F. App’x
582, 586 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that ‘allows extrinsic evidence
unless it tends to prove only criminal propensity.’” (quoting Sanders, 668 F.3d at 1314)).
88. See cases cited infra note 89 and accompanying text.
89. Watson, 766 F.3d at 1235 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Burgess,
576 F.3d 1078, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)); accord United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241,
1248 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 404(b) is considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all
evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 939 (10th Cir. 2013)));
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Fourth Circuit has likewise stated: “We have observed generally that
‘Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, admitting all evidence of other crimes
or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.’”90
Another way that the federal circuit courts have misused the inclusive
structure of Rule 404(b) to create an unwarranted presumption of admissibility
is to use language like “permissive” and “admissible whenever.” For
example, in its 1998 en banc decision in United States v. Crowder, the
D.C. Circuit wrote dismissively of Rule 404(b)(1)’s broad exclusionary
purpose and characterized the rule as “permissive”: “We have recognized
before that although the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is ‘framed restrictively,’
the rule itself ‘is quite permissive,’ prohibiting the admission of other
crimes evidence ‘in but one circumstance’—for the purpose of proving
that a person’s actions conformed to his character.”91 Although Crowder
United States v. Yanez-Rodriguez, 632 F. App’x 442, 444 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 404(b)
is considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except
that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Burgess,
576 F.3d at 1098)); United States v. McGlothin, 705 F.3d 1254, 1263 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“Rule 404(b) is considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes
or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” (quoting United States
v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001))).
90. United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Moore, 709 F.3d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 2013); accord United States v. Reed, 708 F.
App’x 773, 776 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 404(b) is ‘an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence
of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.’” (quoting
United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 651 (4th Cir. 2010))); United States v. Smith, 681
F. App’x 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, admitting all evidence
of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.”
(quoting United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2011))); United States v.
Briley, 770 F.3d 267, 275 (4th Cir. 2014) (“As we have long maintained, the Rule’s
inclusive nature militates toward ‘admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that
which tends to prove only criminal disposition.’” (quoting United States v. Lespier, 725
F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2013))). It should be noted that these opinions were issued before
or at about the same time as the opinion in United States v. Hall, which critically examined
the issue of Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure. 858 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2017). The Hall
case is discussed infra Section IV.B.
91. 141 F.3d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Jenkins,
928 F.2d 1175, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). In a 2000 case, the D.C. Circuit more explicitly
connected “inclusive” and “permissive,” writing:
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion. “[A]lthough the first sentence
of Rule 404(b) is ‘framed restrictively’, the rule itself is ‘quite permissive,’
prohibiting the admission of other crimes evidence ‘in but one circumstance’—
for the purpose of proving that a person’s actions conformed to his character.”
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Crowder, 141
F.3d at 1206).
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is an older case, district court judges within the D.C. Circuit continue to
quote this language in their recent rulings.92 A variation of “permissive”
is the Ninth Circuit’s “admissible whenever”: “We have uniformly recognized
that the rule is one of inclusion and that other acts evidence is admissible
whenever relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s criminal propensity.”93
Most of the federal circuit courts have used the inclusive structure of
Rule 404(b) to assert or imply a presumption that other acts evidence is
admissible. The Eleventh Circuit has used the inclusive structure of Rule
404(b) to additionally suggest a special presumption in favor of admissibility
of other acts evidence offered against a criminal defendant.94 For example,
according to one recent opinion: “Rule 404(b) is characterized as a rule of
inclusion, and thus, 404(b) evidence should not lightly be excluded when
it is central to the prosecution’s case.”95 To some extent, this statement

92. See, e.g., United States v. Zanders, No. 16-197 (RC), 2019 WL 6329400, at *1
(D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2019); United States v. Lieu, No. 17-0050 (RC), 2018 WL 5045335, at
*5 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2018); United States v. Anderson, 174 F. Supp. 3d 494, 496 (D.D.C.
2016).
93. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982). Although
Mehrmanesh is an older case, it is routinely cited in current orders of district courts in the
Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Landa, No. 2:13-cr-00484-CAS, 2019
WL 653853, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019); United States v. Brown, No. 2:17-cr00047(A)-CAS, 2018 WL 739268, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018); United States v. Govey,
No. SACR 17-00103-CJC, 2018 WL 472796, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018); United States
v. Gaussiran, No. CR 16-00739-CJC, 2018 WL 735976, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018).
94. See Capra & Richter, supra note 38, at 780.
95. United States v. Dotson, 660 F. App’x 757, 759 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Hunter,
758 F. App’x 817, 822 (11th Cir. 2018) (“This Court has previously observed that ‘Rule
404(b) is a rule of inclusion’ and relevant Rule 404(b) evidence ‘like other relevant
evidence, should not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.’”
(quoting Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280)); United States v. Clay, 700 F. App’x 898, 902 (11th
Cir. 2017) (“Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion,’ and so ‘404(b) evidence, like other
relevant evidence, should not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s
case.’” (quoting Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280)); United States v. Scanes, 572 F. App’x 899,
901 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Nevertheless, Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion,’ and relevant Rule
404(b) evidence should not lightly be excluded when it is central to the government’s
case.” (quoting Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280)); United States v. Borja-Antunes, 530 F.
App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Nevertheless, Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion’, and
relevant Rule 404(b) evidence ‘should not lightly be excluded’ when it is central to the
government’s case.” (quoting Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280)); United States v. Floyd, 522 F.
App’x 463, 465 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, thus 404(b) evidence
should generally be admitted when essential to establishing a case.” (citing Jernigan, 341
F.3d at 1280)).
The Tenth Circuit has also occasionally made this same statement. See, e.g., United
States v. Roberts, 417 F. App’x 812, 819 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion,
and accordingly 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evidence, should not lightly be excluded
when it is central to the prosecution’s case.” (quoting Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280)). The
origin of this statement seems to be a 1994 Eleventh Circuit case. See United States v.
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simply reflects that most other acts evidence is offered by prosecutors
against criminal defendants. On the other hand, this particular implied
presumption is especially problematic because it is inconsistent not only
with the general purpose of Rule 404, which is the exclusion of character
evidence in all cases,96 but is also inconsistent with what many commentators
consider to be the most important function of the rule: helping to preserve
the presumption of innocence for criminal defendants.97 The presumption
that other acts evidence is admissible because it is important to the
government’s case thus threatens the Rule 404(b) protection against the
erroneous admission of other acts evidence in the very cases in which the
protection is most needed.
IV. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT “INCLUSIVE” HAS BEEN MISUSED
Recently, several of the federal circuit courts of appeals have recognized
that Rule 404(b) has wrongfully come to be viewed as a rule that allows
other acts evidence to be freely admitted, in part because of a mistaken
understanding of the inclusive structure of the rule. Specifically, both the
Third and Fourth Circuit courts of appeals have issued several published
opinions stating that the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) should not be
Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The second sentence of rule 404(b) is
a rule of inclusion, and 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evidence, should not lightly
be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.”).
96. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
97. United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Evidence
of prior convictions may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show
‘intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,’ but not to show character
or propensity. Where prior convictions are concerned, the line between intent or knowledge
and character or propensity is often a fine one, requiring the thoughtful, focused attention
of the district court. The most important reason why this attention is required is that the
introduction of prior convictions, unless carefully handled, will undermine the presumption of
innocence.” (citation omitted) (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b))); see also United States v.
Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The exclusion of other crimes evidence is not
simply a ‘technicality’ designed to prevent law enforcement personnel from doing their
job; it reflects and gives meaning to the central precept of our system of criminal justice,
the presumption of innocence.” (quoting United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118
(D.C. Cir. 1985))); United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 1989) (“By limiting
the admission of bad acts evidence, Rule 404(b) therefore helps secure the presumption of
innocence and its corollary ‘that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he
is.’” (quoting United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977))); United States
v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[A]n obvious truth is that once prior
convictions are introduced the trial is, for all practical purposes, completed and the guilty
outcome follows as a mere formality.”).
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interpreted as creating any sort of presumption in favor of the admissibility
of other acts evidence.98 Additionally, a Seventh Circuit en banc opinion
drew attention to the generally problematic approach to Rule 404(b)’s
application and provided a brief but exemplary discussion of the rule’s
structure.99 These cases are examined in the following sections.
A. The Third Circuit
In a trilogy of impressive opinions, the Third Circuit recently recognized
that its references to Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure had sent the wrong
message regarding the admissibility of other acts evidence. Prior to 2014,
the Third Circuit’s opinions had created an implicit presumption in favor
of admitting other acts evidence based on the inclusive structure of Rule
404(b).100 For example, the court had stated that “Rule 404(b) ‘is inclusive,
not exclusive, and emphasizes admissibility’”101 and that “We have recognized
that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion. We favor the
admission of evidence of other criminal conduct if such evidence ‘is relevant
for any other purpose than to show a mere propensity of the defendant to
commit the crime.’”102
In the 2014 case United States v. Caldwell, a unanimous panel of the
Third Circuit ruled that during appellant Caldwell’s jury trial on a charge
of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court judge erroneously
allowed the government to introduce evidence of Caldwell’s prior convictions
98. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Rule
404(b) is a rule of general exclusion, and carries with it ‘no presumption of admissibility.’”)
(quoting 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:28, at
731 (4th ed. 2013)); United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[The]
characterization of Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion does not render prior convictions
presumptively admissible.” (citing Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276)).
99. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992).
101. United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sampson,
980 F.2d at 886); see also United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 728 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion, which emphasizes the admissibility of
other crimes evidence.” (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir.
1990))); Lee, 612 F.3d at 186 (“Nevertheless, Rule 404(b) ‘is inclusive, not exclusive, and
emphasizes admissibility.’” (quoting Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886)).
102. United States v. Pete, 463 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Wiktorchik,
525 F. App’x 201, 204 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We have recognized that Rule 404(b) is a rule of
inclusion rather than of exclusion. And we favor the admission of other criminal conduct
if such evidence is ‘relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.’” (citation omitted) (first
quoting United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994); and then quoting
United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765 (3d Cir. 1978))).
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for illegally possessing a firearm.103 The government had argued, and the
judge had accepted, that Caldwell’s prior convictions were relevant to
proving his “knowledge and intent” to possess a gun in the present case,
even though in the present case Caldwell did not argue that his possession
of a gun was unintentional or unknowing; his defense was that he did not
possess a gun at all.104
The Third Circuit found that the evidence of the prior convictions
should have been excluded under Rule 404(b).105 In reaching this result,
the court engaged in an extended discussion of the history and purpose of
Rule 404(b), including the change, with the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1975, from an “exclusive” rule, which prohibited other acts
evidence for all purposes except those specifically allowed, to an “inclusive”
rule, which prohibits other acts evidence for the purpose of proving propensity.106
In the course of this discussion, the court stressed that the “inclusive”
structure of the current rule should not be interpreted as creating any sort
of presumption of admissibility: “We have on occasion noted that Rule
404(b) adopted an inclusionary approach. Our use of the term ‘inclusionary’
merely reiterates the drafters’ decision to not restrict the non-propensity
uses of evidence. It does not suggest that prior offense evidence is presumptively
admissible.”107
Not only did the court state that the “inclusive” structure of the rule does
not create a presumption of admissibility,108 the court also stressed that
Rule 404(b) is properly considered a rule of general exclusion: “On this
point, let us be clear: Rule 404(b) is a rule of general exclusion, and carries
with it ‘no presumption of admissibility.’”109 Finally, the court explained
that understanding 404(b) as a rule of general exclusion is important for
fulfilling the purpose of the rule, which is to ensure that criminal defendants
receive fair trials: “The Rule reflects the revered and longstanding policy
that, under our system of justice, an accused is tried for what he did, not
who he is.”110 The court underscored the seriousness of the erroneous

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 271.
Id. at 273–74.
Id. at 274.
See id. at 275–76.
Id. at 276 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 98, at 731).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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admission of other acts evidence by finding that the error in this case was
not harmless.111
A few months after the Caldwell opinion, another panel of the Third
Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. Brown,112 which reinforced
the court’s commitment to replacing misleading language with careful
analysis. In this case, Brown was charged with being a felon in possession
of a firearm, and for the ostensible purpose of proving Brown’s knowledge
of firearms, the prosecutor was allowed to present evidence of Brown’s
prior conviction for a firearms offense.113 The Third Circuit reasoned that
Brown’s general knowledge of firearms was irrelevant in this case because
Brown did not claim that he lacked knowledge of firearms, nor was the
government required to prove anything about Brown’s general knowledge
of firearms to obtain a conviction.114 Further, the prior conviction was
inadmissible to prove Brown’s knowledge of the firearm in the present
case because it relied on a kind of “once a gun dealer, always a gun dealer”
inference, which is prohibited by Rule 404(b).115 And as in Caldwell, the
court underscored the seriousness of the erroneous admission of other acts
evidence by finding that the error was not harmless, explaining: “In this
case, the [other acts evidence] suggested to the jury that Brown was a bad
actor with a history of gun crimes. This necessarily impugns his character
and tends to impermissibly sway the balance in the Government’s favor.”116
In the 2017 case United States v. Repak,117 the Third Circuit again
demonstrated that a proper decision regarding the admission of other acts
evidence requires attention to Rule 404(b)’s purpose, not its structure. In
this case, Repak was charged with bribery and extortion.118 The prosecutor
was allowed to present evidence that Repak solicited additional bribes that
were not included in the charged conduct, for the purpose of proving Repak’s
“corrupt intent” and “knowledge,” as well as “background” and “context.”119
On appeal, the Third Circuit framed its analysis of the Rule 404
question by stressing that the purpose of the rule is the exclusion of
propensity evidence, stating: “While generally excluding evidence of an
individual’s ‘other acts’ to show that individual’s propensity to behave in

111. Id. at 285.
112. 765 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2014).
113. Id. at 291.
114. Id. at 292.
115. See id. at 293 (“The first logical step in the Government’s analysis requires the
jury to conclude that because Brown used a straw purchaser in the past, he must therefore
have used a straw purchaser here.”).
116. Id. at 295.
117. 852 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2017).
118. Id. at 237.
119. Id. at 241–42.
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a certain manner, Rule 404(b)(2) permits admission of other-acts evidence
‘for another purpose . . . .’”120 The opinion refers the rule as one of “general
exclusion” several additional times.121
Perhaps the most important part of the court’s opinion is its explanation,
including the historical context, that Rule 404(b) is inclusive with respect
to structure but exclusive with respect to the admissibility of other acts
evidence:
We clarified in Caldwell that this Court’s past description of Rule 404(b) as
“inclusionary,” referred to Rule 404(b)(2)’s language allowing other-acts evidence to
be used for any purpose other than to show propensity. That is, our prior reference
to Rule 404(b) as inclusionary ‘merely reiterated the drafters’ decision to not
restrict the non-propensity uses of evidence.’ We used that language because,
prior to Rule 404(b), the corresponding common law rule for other-acts evidence
limited the uses of such evidence. Rule 404(b) altered the common law rule with
“inclusionary” language, allowing the proponent of other-acts evidence to identify
any non-propensity purpose and no longer requiring the proponent “to pigeonhole
his evidence into one of the established common-law exceptions, on pain of
exclusion.” In sum, Rule 404(b) is a rule of exclusion, meaning that it excludes
evidence unless the proponent can demonstrate its admissibility, but it is also
“inclusive” in that it does not limit the non-propensity purposes for which evidence
can be admitted.122

The court also reinforced that the proponent of other acts evidence has
the burden of proving that the evidence is being offered for a proper, nonpropensity purpose, stating that “the Government failed to articulate a
chain of inferences supporting the admission of Repak’s uncharged
solicitations.”123
B. The Fourth Circuit
In the 2017 case United States v. Hall, two judges of the Fourth Circuit
explicitly recognized the potential harmfulness of characterizing Rule
404(b) as “inclusive.”124 In this case, the government was allowed to
introduce evidence of Hall’s prior possession with intent to distribute

120. Id. at 240 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)).
121. Id. at 240 (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of general exclusion.” (quoting United States
v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014))); id. at 241 (“Because Rule 404(b) is a rule
of general exclusion . . . .” (citing Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276)).
122. Id. at 240–41 (citations omitted) (first quoting Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276; and
then quoting United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2010)).
123. Id. at 244.
124. 858 F.3d 254, 280 (4th Cir. 2017).
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convictions, ostensibly for the purpose of proving Hall’s knowledge of and
intent to commit the presently charged possession with intent to distribute
offenses.125 On appeal, the government argued that the court should find
that the admission of the evidence was not erroneous in part because “under
[Fourth Circuit] precedent, Rule 404(b) is a rule of ‘inclusion,’ rendering
the prior convictions presumptively admissible.”126
The majority opinion rejected this argument, writing that “our
characterization of Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion does not render prior
convictions presumptively admissible.”127 The majority further explained:
On the contrary, under Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts
is generally inadmissible, properly coming into evidence only when the government
meets its burden to explain each proper purpose for which it seeks to introduce
the evidence, to present a propensity-free chain of inferences supporting each
purpose, and to establish that such evidence is relevant, necessary, reliable, and
not unduly prejudicial.128

Finally, the court highlighted the significant prejudice inherent in other
acts evidence by finding that the other acts evidence was admitted in error
and that the error was not harmless:
The district court’s admission of Defendant’s unrelated prior convictions to establish
knowledge and intent . . . allowed the case to become . . . a case about Defendant’s
character as “a drug dealer.” By admitting Defendant’s prior convictions, the
district court gave rise to the very scenario Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent and
deprived Defendant of his right to be “tried for what he did, not who he is.”129

Despite the powerful reasoning of the majority opinion, Judge Wilkinson
wrote a combative dissent,130 arguing:
“In drug cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior, similar drug transactions is
generally admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of the defendant’s knowledge
and intent.” “Consequently, we have construed the exceptions to the inadmissibility
of prior bad acts evidence broadly, and characterize Rule 404(b) as an inclusive

125. Id. at 259, 260.
126. Id. at 276.
127. Id. at 277 (citing Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276).
128. Id. (citing United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013)).
129. Id. at 288 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276).
130. The dissenting opinion begins by stating that the majority opinion “demonstrates the
encroachment of overactive appellate judging,” id. at 288 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), and
ends with calling the two judges in the majority “dukes and earls of the appellate kingdom,” id.
at 294.

408

58-2_POST_KLEIN_PAGES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 379, 2021]

5/27/2021 2:38 PM

Inclusion Confusion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to
prove only criminal disposition.”131

This dissent’s connection of the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) with
a permissive attitude toward admission of other acts evidence provides
further proof that references to Rule 404(b) as “inclusive” can indeed cause
jurists to infer that Rule 404(b) allows for other acts evidence to be “generally”
or “broadly” admitted.
After Hall, the Fourth Circuit has to some extent reined in its misleading
language regarding the implications of Rule 404(b) being a rule of inclusion,132
although the court does continue to describe Rule 404(b) as a rule of
inclusion and to follow statements about the rule’s inclusive structure with
language about other acts evidence being admissible so long as it is offered
for a non-propensity purpose. For example, the court recently stated: “Rule
404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion,’ and courts should allow the admission of
evidence when it is ‘(1) relevant to an issue other than the general character
of the defendant, (2) necessary, and (3) reliable.’”133 At least one Fourth Circuit
judge has noted that the court’s use of the word “inclusive” remains potentially
misleading; specifically, Judge Wynn—who wrote the majority opinion in
Hall—wrote in a dissenting opinion in the 2019 case United States v. Bell:
In rendering its judgment, the majority opinion characterizes Rule 404(b) as “a
rule of inclusion.” To be sure, this Court has characterized Rule 404(b) as “a rule
of inclusion.” We have done so to make clear that Rule 404(b)’s “list of proper
purposes is not exhaustive.” “That characterization does not displace the longstanding
rule . . . that prior bad act evidence is ‘generally inadmissible.’” Accordingly, the

131. Id. at 291 (citation and emphasis omitted) (first quoting United States v.
Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 755 (4th Cir. 2011); and then quoting United States v. Powers,
59 F.3d 1460, 1464 (4th Cir. 1995)).
132. See United States v. Talley, 767 F. App’x 477, 485 (4th Cir. 2019).
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Sterling, 860 F.3d 233, 246 (4th Cir. 2017)); see
also United States v. Bell, 901 F.3d 455, 465 (4th Cir. 2018) (“It is thus a rule of inclusion
because it ‘recognizes the admissibility of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, with only the one
stated exception.’” (quoting Queen, 132 F.3d at 994)); United States v. Walker-Bey, 800
F. App’x 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2020) (“‘Rule 404(b) is an inclusive rule,’ and ‘allows admission
of evidence of the defendant’s past wrongs or acts, as long as the evidence is not offered
to prove the defendant’s predisposition toward criminal behavior.’” (citation omitted)
(first quoting United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 651 (4th Cir. 2010); and then quoting
Sterling, 860 F.3d at 246)). Thus, even after Hall, the Fourth Circuit opinions continue to
describe Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion and to imply that the rule’s inclusive structure
means that the starting point of a Rule 404(b) analysis is that other acts evidence is admissible.
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majority opinion should not—and cannot—be read as holding that other bad acts
evidence is presumptively admissible.134

Thus, while the Hall case was a large step in the right direction, more—such
as, perhaps, an en banc opinion—remains to be done to correct the Fourth
Circuit’s approach to Rule 404(b).
C. The Seventh Circuit
Some of the credit for drawing attention to problems with the federal
courts’ approach to applying Rule 404(b) should go to the Seventh Circuit’s
2014 en banc decision in United States v. Gomez. 135 This case was a
sweeping reexamination of that court’s approach to Rule 404(b), with the
unanimous en banc court ruling that henceforth admissibility of other acts
evidence requires an examination not only of the ultimate purpose for
which the evidence is being admitted but also of whether the relevance of
that purpose rests on a prohibited propensity inference.136 In this case, the
prosecutor had argued that Gomez’s uncharged possession of a user-quantity
of cocaine was relevant to the question whether he participated in the charged
conspiracy to distribute cocaine; the prosecutor called this purpose “identity.”137
The Seventh Circuit explained, however, that the only way that the uncharged
possession was relevant to the charged conspiracy was because it showed
that Gomez was the kind of person who would possess cocaine, which is
exactly the reasoning prohibited by Rule 404(b).138 Under the Seventh
Circuit’s newly clarified approach to Rule 404(b), admissibility requires
that the other acts evidence be relevant to a non-propensity purpose “without

134. Bell, 901 F.3d at 474 n.1 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting
Hall, 858 F.3d at 266, 276–77).
135. 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
136. Id. at 850, 856 (“We reheard the case en banc to clarify the framework for
admitting other-act evidence. We now conclude that our circuit’s four-part test should be
replaced by an approach that more closely tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence. . . . [T]he
district court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act evidence is relevant to a
non-propensity purpose but how exactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more
specifically, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a propensity inference.”).
Although the Seventh Circuit has received attention for its recognition that a four-factor
test is inferior to requiring the articulation of propensity-free inferences, circuit courts have
tried to require such inquiry in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d
777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen evidence of prior bad acts is offered, the proponent must
clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which
may be the inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged.”
(citing United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994))).
137. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 852.
138. Id. at 863 (“In the end, the government offers no theory other than propensity
to connect the cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom to his identity as Guero, Romero’s
coconspirator.”).
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relying on a propensity inference.”139 Thus, “Rule 404(b) excludes the
evidence if its relevance to ‘another purpose’ is established only through
the forbidden propensity inference.”140
Although the en banc Gomez opinion does not directly address the
problematic characterization of Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion,” the
court does briefly discuss the structure of the rule in a way that other
courts that feel compelled to comment on the structure of the rule might
follow. The opinion’s discussion of Rule 404(b)’s structure begins with
the observation that “A common misconception about Rule 404(b) is that
it establishes a rule of exclusion subject to certain exceptions.”141 The opinion
then explains that the rule’s structure—which the opinion avoids labelling
“inclusive”—makes propensity evidence “categorically inadmissible.”142
The opinion further explains that the examples of non-prohibited purposes
listed in 404(b)(2) do not create “exceptions” to this general principle of
inadmissibility but instead simply illustrate when Rule 404(b) does not
apply.143 The court’s discussion of the structure of Rule 404(b) thus correctly
suggests that non-application of Rule 404(b) does not create any presumption
in favor of admissibility of other acts evidence even when offered for a
non-prohibited purpose;144 instead, other acts evidence offered for a nonprohibited purpose is simply not excluded by Rule 404(b), and admissibility
—far from being “presumed”—is dependent on the operation of the other
rules of evidence.
D. Other Circuits
Although none of the other federal circuit courts of appeals have
recently engaged in the kind of thorough reassessment of Rule 404(b) that
is found in the recent opinions from the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits,
some others have cautioned that the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b)
should not be considered a reason to admit other acts evidence. For example,
the Second Circuit has not explicitly recognized that its references to Rule
404(b) as a “rule of inclusion” have been misleading; however, the court
has occasionally followed such references with a caution that Rule 404(b)’s

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 856.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 855 n.3.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1)).
Id.
See id. at 856.
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inclusive structure “is not a carte blanche” to admit other acts evidence.145
For example, the court has stated:
This Circuit has adopted an “inclusionary” approach to other act evidence under
Rule 404(b), which allows such evidence to be admitted for any purpose other
than to demonstrate criminal propensity. We have, however, emphasized that this
inclusionary rule is not a carte blanche to admit prejudicial extrinsic act evidence
when, as here, it is offered to prove propensity.146

In an older opinion, the Third Circuit similarly stated: “The fact that
Rule 404(b) operates as a rule of inclusion as opposed to operating as a
rule of exclusion does not open the flood gates to evidence that is relevant
only to establish a defendant’s bad character.”147 The Fourth Circuit, also
in an older opinion, stated: “Manifestly the Rule, even though correctly
described as ‘inclusionary,’ does not permit the automatic admission of any
evidence of other ‘crimes, wrongs or acts.’”148
Such statements suggest that the courts themselves realize that their
references to the rule’s inclusive structure risk sending the wrong message,
which they are trying to correct with these cautions. However, given that
the purpose of this rule is to exclude inherently prejudicial evidence, phrases
such as “not carte blanche,”149 “not opening the flood gates,”150 and “not
automatic”151 seem rather begrudging acknowledgements that despite Rule
404(b)’s inclusive structure, other acts evidence is not admissible unless
the proponent of the evidence proves that it is being offered for a nonpropensity purpose.
V. SHIFTING THE FOCUS FROM STRUCTURE TO PURPOSE
In 1975, when the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, the structure
of Rule 404(b) might have been relevant to the question, in any given case,
145. See United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2012).
146. Id. (citation omitted) (citing United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam)); accord United States v. Gracesqui, 730 F. App’x 25, 29 (2d Cir.
2018) (“We have, however, emphasized that this inclusionary rule is not a carte blanche
to admit prejudicial extrinsic act evidence when it is offered to prove propensity.” (quoting
Scott, 677 F.3d at 79)); United States v. Ortiz, 536 F. App’x 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We
have, however, emphasized that this inclusionary rule is not a carte blanche to admit
prejudicial extrinsic act evidence when it is offered to prove propensity.” (quoting Scott,
677 F.3d at 79)); United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Yet this
inclusionary approach does not invite the government ‘to offer, carte blanche, any prior act of
the defendant in the same category of crime.’” (quoting United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127,
137 (2d Cir. 2002))).
147. United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 139 (3d Cir. 1999).
148. United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980).
149. Scott, 677 F.3d at 79.
150. See Morley, 199 F.3d at 139.
151. Masters, 622 F.2d at 86.
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whether other acts evidence should be admitted.152 But today, the inclusive
structure of Rule 404(b) is well known; district court judges are not excluding
other acts evidence under the mistaken impression that the evidence must
fit into any particular exception to Rule 404(b). Instead, the mistake that
district court judges are making—consistent with the circuit courts’ misleading
suggestions that because Rule 404(b) is a “rule of inclusion,” other acts
evidence should be “presumed admissible”—is failing to exclude other acts
evidence when the proponent has not established why and how the evidence
is relevant to proving an issue other than propensity.
Perhaps the easiest way to avoid implying unwarranted presumptions
on the basis of Rule 404(b)’s inclusive structure is simply to avoid any
references to that structure. Although courts that were applying Rule 404(b)
shortly after its adoption in 1975 might have had a good reason for discussing
the rule’s structure, there is no good reason why the federal courts should
still today be referring to the rule as inclusive. The fact that the rule is
inclusive only means that the proponent of other acts evidence need not
“pigeonhole” the evidence into any particular non-propensity exception;
otherwise, the rule’s inclusive structure is meaningless to a proper application
of the rule. As the First Circuit once observed: “Rule 404(b) is sometimes
understood as one of inclusion, and sometimes as one of exclusion. We
ourselves have used both formulations. Whatever the proper formulation,
the exceptions must not swallow the rule.”153 As this statement suggests,
whether the rule is properly labelled inclusive or exclusive makes no
difference to the proper application of the rule. Similarly, a district court
judge in the Third Circuit—following the Caldwell, Brown, and Repak
cases—insightfully observed: “Regardless of whether Rule 404(b) is one
of ‘inclusion’ or ‘exclusion,’ it is clear to me that it is a rule of precision,
requiring a proponent to articulate a specific, non-prohibited purpose for
the evidence, which in practical terms, means a purpose other than
propensity.”154
Despite the many references to Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion,”
many other opinions demonstrate that it is quite possible to accurately
describe what the rule does and does not prohibit using language that avoids

152. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
153. United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 125 n.11 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
154. United States v. York, 165 F. Supp. 3d 267, 269 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (emphasis
omitted).
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creating an unwarranted presumption of admissibility. Examples of Rule
404(b) descriptions that avoid referring to the rule’s structure include:
 The Second Circuit: “Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
generally excludes evidence of other crimes offered ‘to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith,’ except that such evidence may be
admissible for ‘other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.’”155
 The Seventh Circuit: “Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
generally excludes the introduction of bad acts ‘to show that
a defendant has a propensity to commit a crime and that he
acted in accordance with that propensity on the occasion in
question.’ Bad acts evidence may be admitted, however, for
other purposes, such as to show intent, knowledge, lack of
mistake, motive, or opportunity.”156
 The D.C. Circuit: “While Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence generally excludes evidence of ‘other crimes,
wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith,’ it permits such
evidence for such purposes as proving ‘motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.’”157
A reference to the rule’s inclusive structure would not add anything
helpful to these descriptions and would risk creating the unwarranted inference
that “inclusive” means “presumed admissible.”
For courts that feel compelled to refer specifically to the “inclusive”
structure of Rule 404(b), it is important to also point out how the rule is
“exclusive.” For example, the Third Circuit has stated: “Rule 404(b) is a
rule of exclusion, meaning that it excludes evidence unless the proponent
can demonstrate its admissibility, but it is also ‘inclusive’ in that it does
not limit the non-propensity purposes for which evidence can be admitted.”158
This approach is somewhat risky in that it requires careful drafting to
ensure that the precise meanings of “inclusive” and “exclusive” within the

155. United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
404(b)).
156. United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 797 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2005)).
157. United States v. Garces, 133 F.3d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
404(b)).
158. United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 241 (3d Cir. 2017).
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context of Rule 404(b) are stated accurately. For example, this statement
from a Ninth Circuit opinion is somewhat inaccurate, to the extent that
Rule 404(b)’s subsections are not separate rules:
Subsection (1) is a rule of exclusion, establishing that “evidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Subsection (2) is a rule of inclusion, allowing discretionary admission
of evidence of acts extrinsic to the crime charged for a purpose other than to prove
character, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”159

This statement could be revised to more accurately say that “subsection
(1) reflects Rule 404(b)’s exclusionary purpose” and “subsection (2) reflects
the rule’s inclusionary structure.” However, the technical inaccuracy of
this statement is preferable to the substantively misleading characterization
of the whole of Rule 404(b) as “a rule of inclusion.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Many observers of the federal courts believe that in too many cases,
other acts evidence is being admitted for the improper purpose of proving
propensity. There are likely several reasons for this failure of federal district
court judges to exclude other acts evidence that lacks a proper purpose;
this Article has argued that one reason is that the federal circuit courts of
appeals are referring to the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) in ways that
imply a presumption of admissibility.
Because of the likelihood that circuit courts’ references to the inclusive
structure of Rule 404(b) are contributing to the unwarranted admission of
other acts evidence, this Article has proposed that courts stop referring to
the rule as inclusive, or if they cannot give up such references, that they
make clear that the rule is inclusive only with respect to structure but not
with respect to purpose. With respect to purpose, Rule 404(b) is a rule of
absolute exclusion; it exists to exclude all other acts evidence that is offered
for a propensity purpose. Regarding Rule 404(b) as a rule of exclusion might
help turn the tide against the unwarranted admission of other acts evidence
when such evidence lacks a proper non-propensity purpose.

159. United States v. McElmurry, 776 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015) (footnote
omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1)–(2)).
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